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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF COURT
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Rule 3(a) of the
Rules

of Appellate

Procedure

and

specific

constitutional

and

statutory authority for this Court to hear this appeal is granted
by Article VIII, Section 2 Constitution of the State of Utah and
Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(e)(i). At issue is requested review
of certain Orders of the Public Service Commission of the State of
Utah.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENT ON APPEAL
1.

Whether

"standby

unreasonable, unlawful

fees11 or other similar charges are

and/or

Amendment to the United

unconstitutional

States

Constitution

under

the

14th

and/or Article 1

Section 2 of the Utah State Constitution as being violative of the
equal protection clause contained therein.
2.

Whether such fees exceed the scope of statutory authority

given to the Public Service Commission to set reasonable and just
utility rates.
3.

Whether such fees constitute an unjust and unreasonable

standard and classification of service as prohibited by Utah Code
Annotated 54-3-8.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner is a Utah non-profit corporation consisting of the
homeowners of Hi-Country Estates subdivision, Phase I located a few
miles southeast of Heriman, in Salt Lake County, Utah.

Pursuant

to the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and Protective Covenants
of

the

Association,

all

lot

owners,
1

whether

developed

or

undeveloped, are members of the association.

The association is

likewise charged with the duty of representing the interests of all
lot owners regardless of their status of development.
The tariff of Foothills Water Co., the publicly regulated
utility which supplies culinary water service to the residents of
the above subdivision, makes provision for certain "standby fees11.
A standby fee is a charge or assessment levied against property
adjacent to a water main but not usually connected to it.

The

utility remains "standing by" ready to serve the property at the
request of the owner, although it does not at present provide any
utility service to the lot owner.
On or about July 17, 1988 Respondent, Foothills petitioned the
Public Service Commission in Docket No. 87-2010-T03 for approval
of various changes and amendments to its tariff, some of which
dealt directly with the assessing of standby fees to lot owners not
receiving regular water service by Foothills.

Petitioner filed

objections to those proposed changes and a hearing was held before
the Commission on March 1, 1988.
On or about March 9, 1988 the Commission granted in part and
denied in part Foothills proposed changes.

Each of the parties

filed motions for review and rehearing and the Commission issued
an Order on Motions for Review or Rehearing on April 7, 1988. Said
Order in paragraph two (2) denied the Petitioners request that
standby fees be eliminated from the proposed tariff.
On or about March 10, 1988 Petitioner also filed a Petition
for Declaratory Order in re Standby fees before the Public Service
2

Commission in Docket No. 88-2010-01, (proceedings were subsequently
transferred

and undertaken

in Docket No. 85-2010-01).

Said

Petition was argued before the Commission on March 22, 1988
following which the Commission took the matter under advisement.
Respondent Commission has failed and refused to enter a decision
in that case insisting that its ruling in the above reference
tariff case (Docket No. 87-2010-T03) was sufficient and disposed
of the matter without need for a specific Order denying the
Petition for a Declaratory Order.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Petitioner alleges that standby fees are an improper
regulatory

revenue

generating

devise

and

are

further

unconstitutional. Although there is no Utah authority directly on
point and this matter is one of first impression for this Court,
there is clear and overwhelming authority from other jurisdictions
that absent a specific enabling statute or contractual basis, such
fees are unreasonable and unconstitutional in that they deny the
payees procedural due process.
Petitioner further alleges that Utah has no specific enabling
statue which would authorized the Public Service Commission to
allow such fees in the tariffs of publicly regulated water
companies.

The general grant of authority to the Commission to

set "just and reasonable" utility rates is not specific enough to
allow this innovative method of generating revenue for a utility
from is prospective customers.
In addition, Petitioner alleges that such fees apart from not
3

being statutorily authorized are in fact prohibited by specific
state statute in Utah Code Annotated 54-3-8 in that such fees
constitute an "unjust and unreasonable standard and classification
of service to be furnished."
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDBY

FEES

ARE

UNREASONABLE,

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED

UNLAWFUL

AND

IN THE TARIFFS OF

PUBLICLY REGULATED UTILITIES.
This is a case of first impression in the State of Utah and
the

issue

of

the

lawfulness

of

"standby",

"availability"

or

"readiness to serve" charges has never been considered by a Utah
Court of record.
dealing

with

this

There is however a well defined body of law
issue

which

has

been

developed

in

other

jurisdictions which is worthy of recognition here.
The

seminal

case

is

Forest

Hills

Commission 285 N.E. 2d 702 (Ohio 1972).

v.

Public

Utilities

In Forest Hills the Ohio

Supreme Court considered a challenge to standby fees assessed to
owners of unoccupied lots.

At the administrative level the Ohio

Public Utilities Commission had allowed an "availability fee" to
be charged against nonusers of a water system in order to generate
additional operating revenue for the utility.

On appeal from the

Commission's ruling a unanimous Court held:
The assessment by the Public Utilities
Commission of an availability fee charged
against nonusers of a water and sewer system
utility, who are not connected to those systems
but to whom such service is available, is
unreasonable and unlawful. Ibid at 709.

4

The broad invalidation of standby fees in Forest Hills was
partially undercut two years later in the case of Mohawk Utilities
v. Public Utilities Commission 307 N.E. 2d 261 (Ohio 1974).
Following the decision in Forest Hills, such fees were attacked in
the tariffs of other utilities and the Ohio Public Utilities
Commission following the authority of Forest Hills held that:
This commission rules in favor of
complainant and declares the "available
use" classification and charge in
respondents rate schedule unreasonable
unlawful. Mohawk at 262.

the
for
the
and

The Public Utilities Commission in its Order and opinion
directed

Mohawk

Utilities

to

cease

collecting

the

water-

availability charges, and to file new tariffs eliminating such
charges. In partially overruling Forest Hills the Court in Mohawk
noted that a significant difference in the facts between the two
cases was that the sales contracts entered into between the parties
in Mohawk specifically authorized the standby fees in dispute.
In Forest Hills, we held that, since the
commission had no statutory authority to impose
an availability fee, the order imposing such
a charge was unreasonable and unlawful. In the
instant case, the commission was considering
a water-availability charge which was part of
a sales contract entered into between the
parties... Therefore, the decision of the
commission that Mohawk Utilities availabilityfor use charges are per se contrary to law is
unreasonable and unlawful. Ibid at 263.
The distinction between the two cases is critical since
parties can contractually agree to be bound to greater restrictions
than can be

imposed

in the absence

of

their

consent. The

contractual issue takes on a constitutional dimension in this case
5

since

it

invokes

questions

of

procedural

due

process.

In

Aughenbauah v. Board of Supervisors of Tuolumne County 188 Cal.
Rptr. 523 (App. 1983), owners of unimproved lots in a subdivision
brought suit seeking a refund of water standby charges claiming
that they were denied procedural due process by the collection of
the charges.

In Aughenbauah, like Mohawk, there was a contractual

basis for the charges.

The Court held as follows:

Appellant's only constitutional challenge
to the validity of the water standby charges
is one of procedural due process, i.e., they
have been deprived of their property (money)
without proper notice. The argument is without
merit.
Procedural due process safeguards are
designed to provide an individual with the
right to be heard before being condemned to
suffer serious loss of property. (Tribe,
American Constitutional Law (1978) p.502) Fair
notice requirements were met in the instant
case.
When appellants purchased their lots
they were required to sign that they had
received and read a copy of the Final
Subdivision Public Report issued by the
California
Real
Estate
Commissioner
on
September 16, 1969. This report specifically
recited that the revenue bonds; xare secured
by a lien upon revenue to be derived from water
standby and other charges to be prescribed,
revised, and collected by the community
services district from lot owners within the
district.
Water
standby
charges,
if
delinquent, may be collected on the county tax
role and may result in -a lien upon your lot
subjecting it to foreclosure proceedings...
The stand-by charge is payable by the lot
owners whether or not any water is used.' Ibid
at 528.
In like regard is the Court of Appeals of North Carolina which in
the syllabus to State Utilities Commission v. Carolina
Utilities Inc., 21 N.C. App. 146 (1974) stated as follows:
6

Forest

Utilities Commission had jurisdiction and
authority to allow use of availability charge,
in rate schedule, should any be deserved, where
availability charge had been agreed to in
contracts between the parties, i.e. , where each
purchaser of lot in recreational development
had agreed to pay annual water service fee
whether or not he actually tapped onto line or
used any water.
Thus, there has come to be two lines of cases affecting the
lawfulness of standby fees. Such fees are generally invalid under
Forest Hills analysis, unless they qualify for a Mohawk type
exception by the presence of a specific state enabling statute or
a contract binding the party sought to be charged.

Absent this

type of notice such fees are unconstitutional as violative of the
notice requirements of procedural due process.

This potential

defect was succinctly stated in Smith v. Township of Norton 2
Mich.App. 17 (1965) wherein the Court of Appeal of Michigan
invalidated standby fees holding as follows:
Anyone using services of township water system
by implication contracts to pay but to charge
nonusers for services made available by its
presence without regard to whether any use is
made of the services or facility is in legal
effect a tax and can be effected only by
complying with statutory requirements and not
be creation of a charge within the rate
structure of the public service. Ibid at 525.

It is important to note that the instant case falls clearly
under the Forest Hills line of authority.

There is simply no

contract between the parties which could authorize the charges and
absent such a contract, the Mohawk exception does not apply.
Petitioners were unsuccessful in finding a single case upholding
7

standby fees absent a specific state enabling statute or contract.
Petitioners represent owners of unimproved vacant lots as well
as developed lot owners who have their own independent source of
water through on site wells.

Said individuals, who are subject to

the standby fees in the Respondent utilities tariff are "standby
customers" only the most general and tortured sense of the term.
They are not standing by waiting for service from the utility and
in fact actively maintain that they do not want any service from
the utility.

It is only the utility which is "standing by" and it

is waiting for customers that may never materialize.

At best, the

vacant lot and well owners can be said to be only prospective
customers, who may never connect to the water system and make use
of the utilities services.
It is difficult under such circumstances to say that the lot
owners receive any benefit from the utility standing by ready to
serve them.

Any benefit they do receive is incidental and should

not be charged to them.

In Smith the parties stipulated that the

availability of a water system added to the value of the property
and in fact conferred a material benefit but that was held to be
insufficient to justify the imposition of standby fees on such
owners.

The Court quoted The Law of Revenue Bonds . Chernak (19 54)

with approval stating: "The rates, of course, must be based upon
use and not special benefit or other similar criteria, unless
special assessment proceedings are accepted."

Ibid at 200.

It is natural and expected that any property owner will obtain
some

benefit

from

his

surroundings
8

and

the

services

readily

available in the vicinity.

Said services may increase the value

of his property and subject him to greater property taxes but he
should not be liable to the vendor, as a mere prospective customer,
until he actually utilizes the services the vendor is standing by
ready to provide.
II. THE ASSESSMENT OF STANDBY FEES EXCEEDS AND IS OUTSIDE THE
LEGISLATIVE

GRANT OF AUTHORITY

GIVEN

TO

THE PUBLIC

SERVICE

COMMISSION.
The Public Service Commission is a creature of the legislature
and it is well established that the Commission has no inherent
regulatory power other than those expressly granted or clearly
implied by statute. Basin Flying Service, v. Public Service
Commission 531 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah 1975).
The

Commission

has

two

specific

applicable

grants

of

authority. The first is found in Utah Code Annotated 54-4-1 (1969)
which states:
The Commission is hereby vested with power
and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate
every public utility in this state, and to
supervise all of the business of every such
public utility in this state, and to do all
things, whether herein specifically designated
or in addition thereto, which are necessary or
convenient in the exercise of such power and
jurisdiction...
This very broad statute does not however authorize the type
of rate making challenged herein. This Court in interpreting the
statute recently stated:
... this statute has never been interpreted by
this Court as conferring upon the Commission
a limitless right to act as it sees fit.
Explicit or clearly implied statutory authority
9

for any regulatory action must exist. Mountain
States Telephone v. Public Service Commission
81 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 at 8. Citing Utah Dep't
of Business Regulation v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
720 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1986) Kearns-Tribune
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n 682 P.2d 858, 859
(Utah 1984); cf. Basin Flying Serv., 531 P.2d
at 1305.
As argued

above, a standby

fee when not based upon

use

constitutes a tax, which is not permissable within the rate making
authority of the Public Service Commission. (See Smith v. Norton,
Supra).

In like regard this Court in Mountain States stated:
Similarly, not one of the statutes
granting the Commission more specific powers
authorizes, either explicitly or implicitly,
the kind of pooling arrangement adopted by the
Commission in this case. Ibid at 8.

Although Mountain States dealt with telephone carrier surcharge
pooling as a means of funding a discounted telephone service, its
analysis is directly applicable to water standby fees, which like
the Lifeline rates invalidated in Mountain States, are neither
explicitly or implicitly authorized by any state statute.
The only other applicable state statute is found in Utah Code
Annotated 54-3-1 (1977) which provides:
All charges made, demanded or received by
any public utility, or by any two or more
public utilities for any product or commodity
furnished or to be furnished, or for any
service rendered or to be rendered shall be
just and reasonable.
Every unjust or
unreasonable charge made, demanded or received
for such product or commodity or service is
hereby prohibited and declared unlawful. Every
public utility shall furnish, provide and
maintain such service, instrumentalities,
equipment and facilities as will promote the
safety, health, comfort and convenience of its
patrons, employees and the public, and as will
be in all respects adequate, efficient, just
10

and reasonable. All rules and regulations made
by a public utility affecting or pertaining to
its charges or service to the public shall be
just and reasonable. The scope of definition
x
just and reasonablex may include, but shall
not be limited to, the cost of providing
service to each category of customer, economic
impact of charges on each category of customer,
and on the well-being of the state of Utah;
methods of reducing wide periodic variations
in demand of such products, commodities or
services, and means of encouraging conservation
of resources and energy.
The "just and reasonable" standard incorporated in the above
statute is the cornerstone and controlling concept in utility rate
making.

It is difficult however to imagine a more unjust and

unreasonable rate than one which is artificially low because it is
subsidized by nonusers.
It is undisputed that the sole purpose for standby fee, as
used by the Utah Public Service Commission, is to generate
additional revenue for the utility.

In effect the nonusers of the

water system underwrite and support artificially low rates for the
users. Thus, neither the "standby customers" nor the active users
pay a "just and reasonable rate".

The standby customers pay for

something for which they receive no consideration or chargeable
benefit, while the users pay an artificially low rate due to the
standby subsidy.
Although no Utah Court has had the opportunity to address this
statute in this context, other Courts have had such an opportunity
when construing similar statutes.

In fact, it was in part this

very problem with the requirement for "just and reasonable rates"
which lead the Ohio Supreme Court to invalidate standby fees in
11

Forest Hills.
Under R.C. $4909.39, the commission shall
fix and determine ^the just and reasonable
rate' to be charged by such public utility.
Nowhere has the General Assembly empowered the
Public Utilities Commission to fix dual rates
to be charged according to a customer's use or
nonuse of the utility's service. Therefore,
the commission acted both unreasonably and
unlawfully in establishing two rates. Ibid at
708.
III.

THE ASSESSMENT OF STANDBY FEES TO NONUSERS CONSTITUTES

AN UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE STANDARD AND CLASSIFICATION OF SERVICES
AND IS PROHIBITED BY STATUTE.
Utah Code Annotated 54-3-8 (1953) provides:
No public utility shall, as to rates,
charges, service, facilities or in any other
respect, make or grant any preference or
advantage to any person, or subject any person
to any prejudice or disadvantage. No public
utility shall establish or maintain any
unreasonable difference as to rates, charges,
service or facilities, or in any other respect,
either as between localities or as between
classes of service. The commission shall have
power to determine any question of fact arising
under this section.
This

statute has rarely

been

interpreted

by this Court,

however in the case of Cedar City Corporation v. Public Service
Commission 290 P. 2d 454 (Utah 1955) the Court stated the purpose
of the statue to be as follows:
The statute empowers the Commission to
prevent the granting of any preference or
advantage to any person, or subject any person
to any prejudice or disadvantage. Ibid at 457.
In spite of this instruction, standby fees by their very
nature grant one class of users a preference and advantage while

12

subjecting another class, the standby customers, to prejudice and
disadvantage.

As argued above, the existence of standby fees

allows active users to enjoy artificially low rates due to the
subsidy by standby customers.

This Court long ago declared such

a practice to be unlawful.
This section prohibits a utility from
establishing or maintaining discriminatory or
preferential rates or charges, or any
unreasonable difference as to rates, charges,
or service between localities or classes of
service.
Logan City v. Public Utilities
Commission 77 U. 442, 296 P. 1006.
Petitioners

do

not

dispute

that

a

utility

should

be

compensated for the unused capacity it must maintain in order to
meet the service requirements of new customers, however that
compensation should come from connection fees rather than standby
fees.

The tariff at issue allows the assessment of a $750.00

connection fee at the time a lot owner comes "on system" and
becomes an active user. That fee is in excess of the actual costs
of connection

and

is the best way of passing the cost of

maintaining unused capacity to those who have made it necessary.
Only connection fees directly pass the cost on to those who have
received the benefit of the utility standing by to serve them.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is submitted that:
1. This Court should declare standby and other similar fees
to be improper, unlawful and outside the scope of authority granted
to the Public Service Commission for utility rate making, and
2.

Order an accounting of all standby fees paid by nonusers
13

and order a refund of said amounts to them.
WHEREFORE, it is requested

that the Order of the Public

Service Commission upholding the lawfulness of standby fees be
reversed, that said fees be declared invalid and that any sums paid
as standby fees be returned to the payees and that Petitioners
receive its fees and costs incurred on this appeal.
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